The asymmetry of single-peaked preferences has scarcely been incorporated as an assumption in economic models. We analyze how to deal with asymmetric single-peaked preferences in a tractable way. We define natural types of asymmetries, provide the tools to compare degrees of asymmetry, and propose concrete utility functions that represent different directions and degrees of asymmetry. As an application, we provide a representative voter theorem which establishes the heterogeneity in degrees of asymmetry across agents that is compatible with the median being the representative voter.
Introduction
When preferences are single-peaked with respect to a linear order of a set of alternatives, there exists a most preferred alternative (the bliss point) and alternatives located on one side and closer to this point are preferred to those located further away from it. The domain of single-peaked preferences has been extensively analyzed by social choice theorists as a relaxation of the universal domain of preferences. In this restricted domain, certain social choice functions can be characterized in terms of desirable normative properties (see, e.g., Moulin, 1980; Sprumont 1991) . Symmetric single-peaked preferences is an even further restricted domain, as suggested by Massó and Moreno de Barreda (2011): "Often, an agent preferences over the domain of alternatives is responsive also to the notion of distance, embedding to the preferences its corresponding notion of symmetry". Symmetric single-peaked preferences imply that symmetric deviations above and below the peak are identical in terms of utility loses.
In formal political economy as well as in economic policy analysis, the policy space is generally considered to have a meaningful metric: right-wing versus left-wing ideology, expenditure in public good, in ‡ation or marginal taxation among others (Persson and Tabellini, 2000 covers most of these examples). In these …elds, preferences of agents or policymakers over the policy space are usually assumed to be symmetric around their ideal policy. The quadratic or the euclidean distance between the peak and the alternatives provides a tractable utility representation of preferences in these settings.
While the quadratic utility representation of preferences over policies is a standard assumption, certain theoretical models could be enriched with a less restrictive utility representation. Thus, in this paper, we provide a detailed analysis on how to represent, in a similar tractable way, asymmetric single-peaked preferences. We are not the …rst authors raising this point, in fact, Blinder (1997) notes that: "Academic macroeconomists tend to use quadratic loss functions for reason of mathematical convenience, without thinking much about their substantive implications. The assumption is not innocuous, [...] practical central bankers and academics would bene…t from more serious thinking about the functional form of the loss function". Following Blinder's suggestion, there are now a number of economic policy studies that incorporate asymmetric preferences as a critical assumption. Thus, Ruge-Murcia (2003) develops a theoretical model of monetary policy-making which endows the central bank with an asymmetric loss function and …nds that some important results (such as the linear relation between unemployment and the average in ‡ation deviation from the target) do not extend to the asymmetric case. Moreover, he provides empirical evidence supporting the existence of a non-symmetric objective function. Along similar lines, Dolado et al. (2004) show that asymmetric preferences are theoretically important, as they imply the existence of a non-linear monetary policy rule, and provide empirical evidence of such nonlinearity in the US. Exploiting the same implication of asymmetric preferences, Surico (2007) o¤ers evidence supporting that the preferences of the Fed were asymmetric with respect to target values before 1979, when output contractions triggered stronger responses than output expansions. Surico stated that " [...] potential evidence of asymmetries in the central bank objective may be interpreted as evidence of asymmetries in the representative agent's utility." Likewise, within the literature on …scal response to foreign-aid, Heller (1975) and Feeny (2006) highlight the relevance of policymakers'asymmetric single-peaked preferences over deviations with respect to target spending or tax revenues. There are other settings, such as the preferences of citizens over public expenditure which, as suggested by Milyo (2000) do not adjusts to the symmetry assumption. 1 . In this paper, we explore the di¢ culties of dealing with asymmetric singlepeaked preferences. In the same way that the quadratic or euclidean distance functions have facilitated the analysis of symmetric single-peaked preferences, we propose a tractable utility representation of asymmetric single-peaked preferences. Besides, we analyze the degree of asymmetry of preferences across agents for which the preferences of the median agent in the distribution of peaks represents majority preferences.
Within the family of single-peaked preferences, we describe two natural types of asymmetric preferences, those that show shortfall avoidance and those displaying excess avoidance.
2 These de…nitions are based on the comparison of pairs of alternatives symmetrically located about the peak. If every alternative located above the peak is preferred to its symmetric alternative below the peak, we say that preferences show shortfall avoidance. In the opposite case, we say that preferences show excess avoidance.
When preferences over a convex set of alternatives are single-peaked and continuous, every alternative above the peak has an indi¤erent alternative below the peak. For every alternative below the peak, we propose a preferencebias function that measures the distance between the peak and its indi¤erent alternative above the peak. We use this function to compare, when possible, the degree of asymmetry across di¤erent preferences. When single-peaked preferences can be represented by a utility function, we provide su¢ cient conditions to identify whether preferences display one of the proposed types, shortfall avoidance or excess avoidance. We also deduce conditions on the utility representation that allow the comparison of degrees of asymmetry. 3 These conditions are based on the speed at which the slope of the utility function falls. Among other conditions, we …nd that the coe¢ cient of prudence proposed by Kimball can be used, in some cases, to compare the degree of asymmetry across di¤erent utility representations of single-peaked preferences. 4 We analyze how particular utility speci…cations can be used to represent asymmetric single-peaked preferences. First, we de…ne a rich family of utility functions, that we call the generalized single-peaked utility functions. We show that these utility representations can accommodate every direction and degree of asymmetry. Second, we analyze other utility functions that have been used in the literature, the linex loss function proposed by Varian (1974) , and further studied by Zellner (1986) , and the piecewise asymmetric function proposed by Waud (1976) . We explore the direction and degrees of asymmetry that these functions may accommodate.
Finally, we analyze the heterogeneity in degrees of asymmetry across agents' preferences that is compatible with a representative voter theorem (as de…ned by Rothstein, 1991) . It is common in models of public good provision to consider a set of agents with single-peaked preferences, who have to vote over the level of public good provision. When preferences are symmetric about an ideal point, it is clear that the preferences of the median (that is, the agent with peak in the median of the distribution of peaks) coincide with majority preferences. In this case, the location of the peak of the median is su¢ cient to predict the result of majority voting between every pair of alternatives. When preferences are not symmetric about the ideal point, however, there is an additional di¢ culty to derive the result of majority voting given that the preferences of the median do not always coincide with majority preferences. The single-crossing property proposed by Gans and Smart (1996) is su¢ cient for the median agent to be the representative voter according to majority voting. 5 For the case of asymmetric single-peaked preferences, we translate the single-crossing property into a condition on the heterogeneity of the asymmetry of preferences across agents. This condition, that we call nondecreasing shortfall avoidance, guarantees that majority voting preferences and the preferences of the median voter coincide. Moreover, majority voting is the only aggregation rule for which induced social preferences coincide with the preferences of the median voter.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the environment and de…nitions. Section 3 studies conditions on the utility representation to derive the direction and the degree of asymmetry of preferences. Section 4 proposes and analyzes speci…c utility functions. Section 5 is devoted to the representative voter theorem in the case of asymmetries. Section 6 concludes.
The environment and de…nitions
An agent has preferences de…ned over alternatives in R. The space of alternatives we consider has a speci…c and meaningful metric; thus, it is not possible to alter the spatial location of the alternatives. 6 The preferences R of the agent on the set of alternatives is a complete preorder. The set of complete preorders on the set of alternatives is R.
The strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced by R are denoted by P and I respectively. Given R 2 R, the peak of R, when it exists, is an 5 Rothstein (1991) proposes an ordering of voters which su¢ ces for the median of this order to be the representative voter. Rothstein named this condition order restriction. Gans and Smart (1996) showed that a version of order restriction is equivalent to the single-crossing property and o¤ered easy-cheking conditions for a representative voter to exist. The two notions of order restriction, however, are di¤erent as explained by Saporiti and Tohmé (2006) . 6 See Eguia (2011) for an analysis that endogeneizes the spatial representation of the set of alternatives. The SP property of preferences requires that, at each side of the peak, alternatives located closer to the peak are preferred to those located further away from it. The set of complete preorders satisfying SP on the set of alternatives is denoted by R SP . We refer to a generic element of R SP as a SP preferences.
When preferences over a convex set of alternatives are continuous and satisfy single-peakedness, every alternative below the peak can be associated to another alternative above the peak according to the indi¤erence preference relation. In what follows, we interpret d > 0 as a deviation o¤ the peak and de…ne a function that links pairs of indi¤erent alternatives in terms of deviations with respect to the peak. De…nition: The preference-bias function associated to R 2 R SP assigns to every deviation below the peak d, the corresponding (d) > 0 for which e d I e + (d) : In the case that the set of alternatives were bounded, we could also de…ne the preference-bias function. Suppose that e 2 [0; e] ; where e is su¢ ciently large as to guarantee that there exists an alternativeẽ e such that 0 Iẽ. Then, e 2 (0;ẽ) and the preference-bias function is de…ned so that
Observe that by single-peakedness, every preference-bias function is a strictly increasing function. We de…ne three types of SP preferences: symmetric, shortfall avoidance and excess avoidance preferences. De…nition: Let be the preference-bias function associated to R 2 R SP .
we say that preferences show excess avoidance.
Symmetric SP preferences induce indi¤erence between alternatives located symmetrically around the peak. When SP preferences show shortfall 7 The assumption that 0 Iẽ,ẽ 2 (e ; e] is made only to simplify the exposition. Alternatively, if there exists an alternative b e 2 [0; e ) such that e I b e then the preference-bias function is de…ned so that : [0; e b e] ! [0; e e ].
6 avoidance, the comparison between two alternatives symmetrically located at each side of the peak is such that the alternative located above the peak is higher in the preference ordering than the alternative located below the peak. Of course, it is the opposite when SP preferences show excess avoidance. The proposed types of SP preferences do not fully classify the set R SP . These two types, however, capture two natural and meaningful classes of asymmetries in the set of SP preferences. 8 Because the preference-bias function is independent of the location of the peak, one can compare degrees of asymmetry between pairs of preferences even when their respective peaks do not coincide. The following de…nition establishes the binary relation more shortfall avoidance than on R SP .
De…nition: Let R 1 ; R 2 2 R SP with 1 ; 2 denoting their respective preferencebias functions. We say that preferences R 2 show more shortfall avoidance than preferences
According to this de…nition, degrees of asymmetry are comparable across pairs of preference relations when their associated preference-bias functions are such that one is always above the other, i.e.,
Observe, therefore, that the proposed binary relations are partial preorders (transitive but not complete) on the sets of SP preferences which show shortfall avoidance or excess avoidance. 9 3 Conditions on the utility representation Every preference relation R 2 R SP can be represented by a strictly quasiconcave utility function V : R ! R which has a maximizer. The maximizer (or peak of R) satis…es e = arg max V (e): We consider di¤erentiable utility representations so that the peak of R satis…es V 0 (e ) = 0.
8 In particular, these de…nitions do not cover SP preferences which show shortfall avoidance in some ranges of the domain and excess avoidance in others. It would of course be possible to generalize them to account for any SP preference in R.
9 Again, the de…nition could be generalized to compare degrees of asymmetry in speci…c intervals of the domain of d.
Conditions for asymmetric SP preferences
In terms of the utility representation, when SP preferences display shortfall avoidance, V (e d) < V (e + d) for all d; and when they display excess avoidance, in turn, V (e d) > V (e +d) holds for all d. Figure 1 depicts two examples of utility functions representing shortfall avoidance, excess avoidance and its respective preference-bias functions. 
That is to say, if and only if marginal utility at every pair of symmetric deviations above and below the peak coincide. Similarly, certain properties of the slope of V guarantee that preferences show shortfall avoidance or excess avoidance.
Proof. The following claims prove our statement. 
for all d. By SP, V 0 (e ) = 0; and substituting in the inequality yields
By conditions (1a) and (1b), the comparison of the slopes of the utility representation of SP preferences at every symmetric deviation with respect to the peak reveals the direction of the asymmetry. Conditions (2a) and (2b) also reveal the direction of the asymmetry by checking whether the marginal utility function is strictly concave or strictly convex. 11 where preferences R 2 (represented by V 2 ) show more shortfall avoidance than preferences R 1 (represented by V 1 ). The peak of both preferences is the same and their associated preference-bias functions 1 and 2 can be easily compared. 10 The analogous statements on preferences showing excess avoidance can be proved following a similar reasoning (that we omit in the interest of brevity). 11 For a concrete application of conditions (2a) and (2b) see Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) where central banks'preferences show excess avoidance over in ‡ation and shortfall avoidance over output gap. Next, we show that the comparison between the slopes of di¤erent utility representations indicates the strength of the asymmetry across di¤erent preferences. For each pair of preferences R 1 ; R 2 2 R SP ; we denote by e 1 , e 2 their respective peaks.
Comparison of degrees of asymmetry
Proposition 2 Let V 1 ; V 2 be two di¤erentiable utility representations of
2 (e 2 + ) for all 2 R; then R 2 show more shortfall avoidance than R 1 : 
2 (e)de, at the same time, and given that 0 > V
By de…nition of the preference-bias function there is 1 (d) > 0 for which
Since B A; then (1) and (2) imply
i.e., below the peak, equal-distance deviations generate more disutility with V 2 than with V 1 , and above the peak, equaldistance deviations generate more disutility with V 1 than with V 2 :
The degree of asymmetry can also be compared using the degree of concavity or convexity of the marginal utility function. For this, one of the marginal utility speci…cations must be obtained as an increasing transformation of the other.
Proposition 3 Let V 1 ; V 2 be strictly concave utility representations of
for all e 2 R where = e 2 e 1 , then R 2 show more shortfall avoidance than R 1 .
Proof. By strict concavity of V 1 and V 2 ; the functions V 
:
Given that
; V 00 2 < 0 and g 0 > 0; we deduce that g 00 (V 0 2 (e+ )) 0 (i.e., g must be concave). 12 If e 2 = e 1 , then = e 2 e 1 = 0; and it is possible to compare degrees of asymmetry just by comparing
2 (e) .
By de…nition of 1 ; it follows that V 1 (e 1 d) = V 1 (e 1 + 1 (d)
By concavity of g;
2 (e + ))de g(
) and given that g is strictly increasing with g(0) = 0; then
and by single-peakedness, it must be the case that 1 (d)
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on the theories developed by Arrow (1971), Pratt (1964) and Kimball (1990) . In Arrow-Pratt's theory of risk aversion, concavity of the utility function over consumption indicates the presence of risk aversion, while according to Kimball's theory of precautionary savings, concavity of the marginal utility function entails precautionary saving behavior. In each case, the degree of concavity of the utility function or the degree of concavity of the marginal utility function measures risk aversion or precautionary savings respectively. 13 These behavioral traits become thus comparable across pairs of concave functions such that one is a concave transformation of the other.
In our context, as long as V is strictly concave, the curvature of the marginal utility function determines the degree of asymmetry. Interestingly, we can apply the coe¢ cient of prudence (proposed by Kimball, 1990 ) to measure whether preferences show more shortfall avoidance for the more convex marginal utility representation (or, equivalently, more excess avoidance for the more concave marginal utility representation). We use this idea to de…ne a coe¢ cient that measures the asymmetry of SP preferences. De…nition: Let V be strictly concave utility representation of R 2 R SP . We refer to the ratio p(e) = V 000 (e) V 00 (e) as the coe¢ cient of shortfall avoidance.
According to Proposition 3, the higher p(:); the greater the degree of shortfall avoidance. When p(:) is constant and p(:) < 0, we say that pref- 13 Arrow-Pratt's coe¢ cient of risk aversion is de…ned by erences show constant shortfall avoidance. Likewise, when p(:) is constant and p(:) > 0; we say that preferences show constant excess avoidance. We can also de…ne increasing or decreasing shortfall avoidance or increasing or decreasing excess avoidance. 14 In the case of a constant coe¢ cient of asymmetry, shortfall avoidance can be directly compared among di¤erent utility speci…cations.
Corollary 1 Let V 1 and V 2 be strictly concave utility representations of R 1 ; R 2 2 R SP . If the coe¢ cient of asymmetry is constant and such that p 1 p 2 ; then R 2 show more shortfall avoidance than R 1 .
for all : Thus,
2 (e) V 00 2 (e)
implies that
for all e 2 R, which according to Proposition 3, this is equivalent to asserting that R 2 show more shortfall avoidance than R 1 :
Corollary 1 can be useful to compare degrees of asymmetry across di¤erent utility functions (see, for example, the linex loss function that is analyzed in the following section).
Asymmetric SP utility representation
In this section, we analyze utility functions representing asymmetric SP preferences. First, we propose a new utility function based on the preference-bias function. Second, we analyze two other utility functions that have been proposed in di¤erent contexts to represent asymmetric single-peaked preferences.
The generalized single-peaked utility function
The utility function representing SP preferences and based on the distance function is such that V (e) = f (e e ) where f is a continuous and strictly increasing distance function between the peak e and the alternative e. Particular examples of f are the quadratic function, in which f (e e ) = [e e ] 2 ; the distance function induced by a norm, in which f (e e ) = ke e k ; or any function f (e e ) = je e j where > 0:
Given preference R 2 R SP , the preference-bias function associated to R assigns to each deviation below the peak, the deviation above the peak for which the agent is indi¤erent. Let 1 : R + ! R + be the inverse of the preference-bias function. 15 The generalized single-peaked utility function is de…ned by
when e e f ( 1 (e e )) when e > e :
Below the peak, the proposed utility function coincides with the distance function. In order to capture the preference-bias, the level of utility derived from any alternative above the peak is equal to the corresponding utility value at its indi¤erent alternative below the peak. If the SP preference relation is symmetric, i.e., 1 (d) = d, the generalized single-peaked utility function collapses to V (e) = f (e e ) for all e:
The generalized single-peaked utility function can also be de…ned in the case in which the set of alternatives is bounded. If e 2 [0; e] and 0 Iẽ; the inverse of the preference-bias function is bounded above by 1 (ẽ e ) = e ; which corresponds to the indi¤erence relation 0 Iẽ. We can extend the domain of 1 to every d 2 (ẽ e ; e e ] in a strictly increasing way. Thus, the generalized single-peaked utility function is de…ned by
f (e e ) when e 2 [0; e ] f ( 1 (e e )) when e 2 (e ; e] :
Observe that the utility derived from alternatives e 2 (ẽ; e] is below V (ẽ) and that the utility function is strictly decreasing in e 2 (ẽ; e].
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Arguably, the generalized single-peaked utility function is derived from the set of indi¤erent alternatives of the primitive preference relation. Another is that it maintains the tractability of the distance functions (including smoothness if the distance function is smooth). Next, we show that it can accommodate every SP preferences, including those which satisfy our de…nition of shortfall and excess avoidance.
Proposition 4 Every preference R 2 R
SP can be represented by the generalized single-peaked utility function.
Proof. First, we show that every preference relation R 2 R SP is represented by the generalized single-peaked utility function. The preference ordering across alternatives located at the same side of the peak is captured by the distance-metric utility function below the peak, and above the peak, by a function that is strictly decreasing in distance (given that 1 is a strictly increasing function in all its domain). The preference ordering of pairs of alternatives located at opposite sides of the peak can be deduced by identifying the pairs of alternatives yielding equal utility. Thus,
Observe that the generalized single-peaked utility function is that it can be used to compare pairs of preferences such that one of them shows more shortfall avoidance than the other. Given a distance function f; the utility derived from every alternative below the peak is normalized. Thus, if we account for two di¤erent functions V 1 ; V 2 we have that V 0 2 (e 2 d) = V 0 1 (e 1 d) for every alternative below the peak. Above the peak, however, the derivative does not coincide when we represent two distinct preferences. In the case that 1 
, is a su¢ cient condition to show that R 2 show more shortfall avoidance than R 1 .
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If we take a linear preference bias-function (d) = kd with k > 0; the corresponding generalized single-peaked utility function is
f (e e ) when e e f ( e e k
) when e > e :
Under this utility speci…cation, k > 1 represents a particular class of SP preferences that show shortfall avoidance, while k < 1 corresponds to another class of SP preferences that exhibit excess avoidance. Because the preferencebias function does not need to be linear; we can think of diverse functional forms yielding di¤erent asymmetric SP preferences. Thus, it is possible to represent more complex asymmetries than the basic types previously de…ned. For instance, we can represent preferences that display excess avoidance for some values of d; and shortfall avoidance for others. 18 Our proposal accommodates every continuous and strictly increasing distance function, in particular, a rich family of utility speci…cations are given by:
where di¤erent values of > 0 yield di¤erent utility functions. It is straightforward to check that these functions are smooth, i.e., they are continuously di¤erentiable in all the domain, including the peak. (Zellner, 1986 ) and optimal forecasting (Christo¤ersen and Diebold, 1997). According to our notation, this utility speci…cation is de…ned by:
The linex loss function
where 2 R. Observe that this speci…cation yields V (e ) = 0:
Proposition 5 The linex loss function can represent shortfall avoidance when > 0 and excess avoidance when < 0: Besides, its coe¢ cient of shortfall avoidance is constant and equal to in the case of shortfall avoidance, and equal to in the case of excess avoidance. 
16
Proof. We can directly solve for the …rst, second and third derivatives of V , which can be used to measure the direction and the degree of asymmetry:
The second derivative guarantees concavity of the utility speci…cation. By Proposition 1, the sign of the third derivative implies that the linex utility function represents shortfall avoidance when > 0 and excess avoidance when < 0: By Proposition 3, the coe¢ cient of asymmetry is V 000 V 00 , which equals when there is shortfall avoidance and when there is excess avoidance.
According to our results, the linex function can accommodate the two types of asymmetry (shortfall and excess avoidance). Because its coe¢ cient of asymmetry is constant, by Corollary 1, it is easy to represent and compare di¤erent degrees of asymmetry just by changing or comparing the value of . This utility representation, however, cannot represent every preference R 2 R SP . For instance, it cannot represent preferences which show excess avoidance for some values of d; and shortfall avoidance for others.
The piecewise asymmetric function of Waud
Finally, we analyze another utility representation of asymmetric SP preferences proposed by Waud (1976) . Using our notation, this utility speci…cation is de…ned by:
f (e e) when e e f (e e ) when e > e
where f is a strictly increasing and convex function, f (0) = 0 and > 0. Observe that < 1 represents preferences showing shortfall avoidance, while > 1 corresponds to preferences showing excess avoidance. Additionally, by Proposition 2, when > 1, the higher the coe¢ cient ; the more excess avoidance the preferences show. Thus, the function proposed by Waud can represent preferences of the two basic asymmetric types (shortfall and excess avoidance). Furthermore, this allows for comparisons of degrees of asymmetry just by checking the value of . Nevertheless, this utility representation cannot represent every preference R 2 R SP .
By the de…nition of the preference-bias function,
for all d: Given a convex function f; that condition imposes a restriction on the preference-bias function and thereby on the preferences it can represent. To illustrate such restriction, let f be the quadratic function; then, the preference-bias function must satisfy
e., has to be linear in d. This example illustrates that this utility speci…cation cannot represent every preference R 2 R SP : Additionally, there are preference-bias functions for which no function f exists such that Expression (8) represents these preferences (consider again the case of preferences which show excess avoidance for some values of d; and shortfall avoidance for others).
Representative voter theorem
A representative voter theorem establishes conditions under which the preferences of a speci…c agent (e.g. the agent with median peak if the pro…le of preferences is single-peaked) are predictors of majority voting rule. 19 In this section, we consider a continuum of agents with SP preferences. We assume that agents with the same peak are of the same type so that their preferences o¤-the-peak are also equal. Types of agents are ordered according to the peaks, so that if i; j are two di¤erent types and i < j; then e i < e j .
A preference pro…le R N describes the preferences of all the agents. There is a continuous distribution function of peaks across agents. The peak of the median type is denoted by e m and her preferences are denoted by R m . Let e; e 0 2 R be two di¤erent alternatives and let N (e; e 0 ) be the percentage of voters for whom eR i e 0 . We say that e is preferred to e 0 under majority rule (denoted by eR M e 0 ) if and only if N (e; e 0 ) N (e 0 ; e): We refer to R M as majority preferences. The strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced by R M are denoted by P M and I M respectively. The proposed de…nition of majority rule is equivalent to that of plurality rule given that we only account for pairwise comparisons of alternatives. Observe, however, that this concept di¤ers from simple majority rule by which e is preferred to e 0 if and only if N (e; e 0 ) 1=2: The property of single-crossing is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of an agent whose preferences coincide with majority preferences. De…nition: A preference pro…le R N satis…es (strict) single-crossing if for all e; e 0 2 R where e < e 0 : e 0 R i e; implies e 0 P j e for all j > i.
By single-crossing, if an agent prefers an alternative e 0 over another e; where e 0 is greater than e, then every agent indexed above this one also prefers alternative e 0 over e. Neither single-crossing implies single-peakedness nor single-peakedness implies single-crossing. 20 The important implication of this property is the following:
Proposition 6 (Gans and Smart 1996, Theorem 2) If the preference pro…le R N satis…es (strict) single-crossing, then the majority preferences and the preferences of the median voter coincide.
Thus, single-crossing is a su¢ cient condition for a representative voter theorem. When the SP preferences of all the agents are symmetric, the singlecrossing property holds. When preferences of the agents are asymmetric, as pointed out by Rothstein (1991), we cannot guarantee a representative voter theorem. The author, however, shows that this is not true for particular cases.
Proposition 7 (Rothstein 1991, Theorem 4) Let f 1 ; 2 ; :::g be the preferencebias functions associated to the di¤erent types of a single-peaked preference pro…le R N : If for all i; i = kd, with k > 0 common for every agent, then majority preferences and the preferences of the median voter coincide.
There are some examples in which an agent, di¤erent from the median of the peaks, is such that her preferences coincide with majority preferences. 21 We, however, focus on those cases in which the representative voter (when it exists) coincides with the agent whose peak is the median of the peaks.
Next, we translate the single-crossing property in terms of degrees of asymmetry of preferences across types of agents. We go beyond Rothstein (1991) showing that certain heterogeneity in the asymmetry of preferences across types of agents is compatible with a representative voter theorem. We 20 Sapority and Tohmé (2006) illustrate this point. 21 See for instance Rothstein (1991) , Figure 1. consider a particular type of heterogeneity of preferences across agents that we call non-decreasing shortfall avoidance. De…nition: Let f 1 ; 2 ; :::g be the preference-bias functions associated to the types of single-peaked preference pro…le R N : We say that R N satis…es non-decreasing shortfall avoidance when i (d) j (d) for all d and all j > i: Figure 3 depicts a particular pro…le of preferences satisfying this property. Observe in the …gure that those agents with higher peak show higher degrees of shortfall avoidance. According to our results in Section 3, we can provide conditions on the di¤erentiable utility representation of preferences which guarantee that nondecreasing shortfall avoidance holds.
Corollary 2 Given the single-peaked preference pro…le R N and its corresponding utility representations, each of the following conditions guarantee that R N satis…es non-decreasing shortfall avoidance:
for all e 2 R and j > i where = e j e i ; iii) the coe¢ cient of shortfall avoidance is constant and such that agents with higher peak have (weakly) higher coe¢ cients, i.e., p i p j for all j > i:
An aggregation rule, f , assigns to every pro…le of preferences, a re ‡exive and complete binary relation. Among the family of all aggregation rules, the voting rules are a particular type. 22 We refer to R f as the social preferences induced by an aggregation rule f where, in particular, R M refers to the social preferences induced by majority voting rule.
Proposition 8
If the single-peaked preference pro…le R N satis…es non-decreasing shortfall avoidance, then majority rule is the only aggregation rule such that the induced social preferences coincide with the preferences of the median voter Proof. By non-decreasing shortfall avoidance, i (d) j (d) for all d and all j > i: Given that, by de…nition, the preference-bias function is increasing,
when e j e i > 0 (i.e., when j > i) and
Let e; e 0 be two di¤erent alternatives, where e < e 0 ; such that e 0 R i e. If either e 0 < e i and/or e 0 < e j where j > i; by single-peakedness e 0 P j e: For singlecrossing to hold, we have to show that e 0 P j e even when e 0 > e j : Given that e 0 R i e we deduce that
Combining inequalities (9) and (10), j (e i e + e j e i ) + e j e i > e 0 e i ; which simplifying yields j (e j e) > e 0 e j : In terms of the preference relation of agent j this implies that e 0 P j e when e 0 > e j : Thus, the (strict) single-crossing property holds and by Proposition 6, R M = R m : Consider an aggregation rule f di¤erent from majority rule. Then, there must be a pro…le of preferences for which two alternatives e 0 ; e 1 satisfy that e 0 P f e 1 when N (e 0 ; e 1 ) < N (e 1 ; e 0 ); i.e., R f 6 = R M : As a consequence, R f 6 = R m :
According to Proposition 8, heterogeneity in the asymmetry of preferences in the form of non-decreasing shortfall avoidance guarantees that the information about social preferences induced by majority rule is contained in the preferences of the median voter. Besides, the social preferences induced by any other aggregation rule require more information about the preferences of voters than that contained in the preferences of the median voter. 22 Following Austen-Smith and Banks (1999), among the family of all preference aggregation rules, the voting rules are characterized by two properties: neutrality and monotonicity (for example, Borda rule).
Conclusion
Both in formal political economy and in economic policy analysis, it is relevant to incorporate political actors endowed with asymmetric single-peaked preferences. For example, the asymmetry of preferences of central banks over in ‡ation, and over output gap is crucial to derive optimal monetary policies 23 ; the asymmetry of policymakers or the preferences of voters over public expenditure and public debt is also relevant in the analysis of political decisions. Whether the predictions of some models are robust to the asymmetry of preferences is a question that, from our point of view, deserves more careful attention. 24 We have explored the way of representing and comparing di¤erent degrees of asymmetric single-peaked preferences. We have identi…ed su¢ cient conditions on standard utility representations that reveal the direction (if any) of the asymmetry of preferences and another that allows the comparison of degrees of asymmetry across di¤erent preference relations. We have pay particular attention to the utility representation of these asymmetries. We have come up with a new proposal, the generalized single-peaked utility function, that not only represents the single-peaked preferences with any direction and degree of asymmetry, but also maintains the analytical tractability and smoothness of the distance functions. We have also explored in detail two other utility representations of asymmetric single-peaked preferences: the linex loss function and the utility function proposed by Waud. Interestingly, we …nd that the linex loss function shows a constant coe¢ cient of asymmetry. In this case, di¤erent degrees of asymmetry can be parametrized by a single variable. Finally, we have explored the degree of heterogeneity on asymmetries across agents that is compatible with a representative voter theorem. The well-known single-crossing property implies, in the domain of single-peaked preferences, non-decreasing degrees of shortfall avoidance across agents with higher peak. Thus, if the modeling assumption is such that the preferences of agents show non-decreasing shortfall avoidance, then the preferences of the agent with peak in the median represents the social preferences according to majority rule. 25 Besides, the social preferences induced by any other aggregation rule di¤er from the preferences of the median.
We believe that our results can be very useful to incorporate, in a tractable way, a richer domain of single-peaked preferences. 26 
